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within the scope of the Directive. The SAS was not listed
until the Directive was amended in 2003 (see 2.2.), four
years after the tax year concerned in the Gaz de France
case. The Directive was transposed into German
national law in the German Income Tax Act (Einkom-
mensteuergesetz, EStG 1999).4 Gaz de France SAS’s appli-
cation was rejected by the German tax office on the
ground that Gaz de France SAS was not a “company of a
Member State”within the meaning of the Directive.After
its objection was dismissed, Gaz de France SAS appealed
to the Cologne Tax Court (Finanzgericht Köln).5 The Tax
Court considered that, based on a literal reading of the
relevant provisions, an SAS is not one of the forms of
French companies listed in the Annex to the Directive.6
As it was not sure whether or not it should restrict itself
to such a literal interpretation of the relevant provisions,
the Tax Courtreferred two questions to the ECJ:
(1) Is it possible to interpret Art. 2(a) of the Directive in
conjunction with point (f ) of the Annex as meaning
In Gaz de France the ECJ held that an SAS does
not fall within the personal scope of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, as it is not listed in the
Annex thereto. Furthermore, it concludes that
the exclusion of an SAS from that scope does not
constitute unequal treatment. The authors
closely examine, and criticize, the rather
restrictive approach that led to those
conclusions. Subsequently, an overview is
provided of the potential implications of Gaz de
France.
1. Introduction
In Gaz de France,1 the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
was asked to interpret the term “company of a Member
State” under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (the Dir-
ective).2 A company of a Member State falling within the
scope of that Directive and fulfilling specific criteria is,
inter alia, exempt from withholding tax when it receives
a dividend. The ECJ applied a very “restrictive” – in the
authors’ view too restrictive – approach in determining
which companies can be regarded as “companies of a
Member State”. This resulted in an outcome that was, at
the very least, arbitrary, if not discriminatory (see espe-
cially 4.2.). The ECJ, however, considers that outcome
inherent to the gradual process of harmonization in the
field of direct taxation. In this contribution the authors
closely examine the ECJ’s reasoning in Gaz de France. In
the authors’ view, the ECJ could have provided a more
extensive and more satisfying interpretation, without
exceeding its judicial powers. Finally, the implications of
Gaz de France are discussed, in particular, the effect on
dividend distributions to companies outside the scope of
the Directive.
2. Factual and Legal Background
2.1. Facts, dispute and national proceedings
On 16 June 1999, Gaz de France Deutschland GmbH
distributed a dividend to its 100% parent company Gaz
de France SAS (société par actions simplifiée, a new form
of company introduced in French company law in 1994).
Upon the dividend distribution, Gaz de France Deutsch-
land GmbH paid withholding tax to the Bundeszen-
tralamt für Steuern, the competent German tax office.3
Subsequently, Gaz de France SAS applied to the German
tax office for a reimbursement of the withholding tax.
The SAS was not listed in the Annex to the Directive,
which lists the companies of Member States that fall
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1. ECJ, 2 October 2009, Case C-247/08, Gaz de France – Berliner Investisse-
ment SA v. Bundeszentralamt für Steuern.
2. Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system
of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of dif-
ferent Member States (OJ 1990, L225/6), as amended by the Act of Accession
of Austria, Sweden and Finland (OJ 1995, L1/1). As the case concerned the
1999 tax year, the amendments to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive by Council
Directive 2003/123/EC (OJ 2004, L7/41), the Act of Accession of the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,Malta, Poland, Slovenia
and the Slovak Republic (OJ 2003, L263/33) and Council Directive
2006/98/EC of 20 November 2006 adapting certain Directives in the field of
taxation, by reason of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (OJ 2006,
L363/129) were not relevant.
3. A “Kapitalertragsteur”, an investment income tax, of DM 49,019.35 and a
“Solidaritätszuschlag”, solidarity surcharge, of DM 2,696.06.
4. Para. 44d of the German Income Tax Act provides that: “On application,
investment income tax shall not be charged on investment income within the
meaning of Para. 20(1)(1) […] accruing to a parent company where neither
that company’s registered office nor its administration is located in the
national territory, and deriving from the distribution of the profits of a capital
company with unlimited liability to tax within the meaning of Para. 1(1)(1) of
the Law on corporation tax, or from the refunding of corporation tax.”
5. Note that a typographical error occurs in Para. 14 of the English transla-
tion of the online version of the judgment, where the phrase “the defendant in
the main proceedings” is used, instead of “the applicant”. This is incorrect as it
was the defendant that rejected the reimbursement application. Furthermore,
it is a deviation from the term “demanderesse” in the French version and the
term“Klägerin” in the German version of the case.
6. The following companies were listed: “société anonyme”, “société en com-
mandite par actions”, “société à responsabilité limitée” (until 2004 point (f ), now
point (j) of the Annex to the Directive).
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that an SAS may be regarded as a “company of a
Member State”?
(2) Does Art. 2(a) of the Directive in conjunction with
point (f ) of the Annex infringe the freedom of estab-
lishment or the free movement of capital by provid-
ing an exemption from withholding tax for the three
listed French legal forms but not for French
companies taking the legal form of the SAS?7
2.2. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive
The Directive, inter alia, ensures that a dividend distrib-
uted by a subsidiary in one Member State to a parent
company in another Member State is exempt from with-
holding tax.8 The (personal) scope of the Directive is
limited by the requirement that both the distributing
company and the receiving company be regarded as a
“company of a Member State”, as defined in Art. 2. Art. 2
provides that a company can be considered a “company
of a Member State” if three cumulative requirements are
met.9 One requirement is that a company should have a
qualifying legal form as listed in the Annex to the Dir-
ective. The Annex to the Directive listed the following
French legal forms:
companies under French law known as “société anonyme”,
“société en commandite par actions”, “société à responsabilité
limitée”, and industrial and commercial public establishments
and undertakings.10
Although the tax year concerned in Gaz de France is
1999, it is noteworthy that in 2003 the Annex to the Dir-
ective was extended to include “new” legal forms, includ-
ing the French SAS.11 Furthermore, in addition to specif-
ically listing qualifying legal forms, a catch-all clause was
introduced for the majority of the Member States, which
ensured that a non-listed legal form constituted under
the laws of a Member State that is subject to the corpo-
rate income tax in that Member State may also be con-
sidered a “company of a Member State”.12
3. Advocate General and the ECJ
3.1. Opinion of Advocate GeneralMazák
Advocate General Mazák assessed whether or not it was
possible, by means of an interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Directive and its Annex, to conclude
that an SAS also came within the scope of the Directive.
He starts his analysis by acknowledging that the SAS was
not listed in the initial version of the Directive, as it did
not exist at that time. According to Mazák, a “purely lit-
eral interpretation of [the Directive] would result in a
negative answer”.13 In this respect, he follows the ECJ’s
standard reasoning that if a literal interpretation does
not suffice both“the wording of the provision on which a
ruling on interpretation is sought, and the objective and
the scheme of the directive” should be taken into
account.14 The objective of the Directive (the elimina-
tion of any penalties against companies of different
Member States that cooperate in comparison to
companies of the same Member State) was not intended
to be extended to all companies of the Member States.
According to the Advocate General, the legislative tech-
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nique of listing specific legal forms of companies of the
different Member States may be “imperfect” and not “suf-
ficiently forward-looking”, as it “does not allow Commu-
nity legislation to adapt to changes in national legisla-
tion”.15 Nevertheless, Mazák is of the opinion that
interpreting the relevant provisions of the Directive and
its Annex as meaning that an SAS also falls within the
scope of the Directive would “amount to replacing the
legislative procedure by methods of interpretation”.16
The suggestion of Gaz de France and the Commission
that the SAS is a particular type of SA, and has, therefore,
always been included in the Annex, was not further elab-
orated on by the Advocate General. Such a conclusion
would require the ECJ to interpret French company law,
which the ECJ is not competent to do. The Advocate
General, therefore, concluded, with regard to the first
question, that an SAS is not a “company of a Member
State”.
As regards the second question, the Advocate General
examined whether or not Art. 2(a) of the Directive
resulted in an infringement of the freedom of establish-
ment of Arts. 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty (now Arts. 49
and 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)).17 The Advocate General reiterated that
7. Finanzgericht Köln, 23 May 2008, 2 K 3527/02; reprinted in 17 Interna-
tionales Steuerrecht (2008), p. 595, with comments by H. Rehm and J. Nagler,
p. 597 and comments by G. Jorewitz, p. 600; see also G.W. Kofler, “The Rela-
tionship between the Fundamental Freedoms and Directives in the Area of
Direct Taxation”, VI Diritto e Pratica Tributaria Internazionale 2 (2009) p. 493.
8. Art. 5(1) of the Directive; on the condition that the parent company
holds at least 25% of the capital of the subsidiary.
9. Art. 2 of the Directive provides that: “For the purposes of this Directive
‘company of a Member State’ shall mean any company which: (a) takes one of
the forms listed in the Annex hereto; (b) according to the tax laws of a Mem-
ber State is considered to be resident in that State for tax purposes and, under
the terms of a double taxation agreement concluded with a third State, is not
considered to be resident for tax purposes outside the Community; (c) more-
over, is subject to one of the [Corporate income] taxes [which are enumerated
in Art. 2(c) of that Directive], without the possibility of an option or of being
exempt”.
10. For the purposes of this article, the application of the Directive to“indus-
trial and commercial public establishments and undertakings” will not be dis-
cussed in further detail.
11. By 1 January 2005 at the latest, the SAS had to have been explicitly listed
in national law in order to qualify for an exemption from withholding tax,
provided that it also fulfilled the other criteria of the Directive. Although
Council Directive 2003/123/EC entered into force on 2 February 2004 (Art. 3
of Directive 2003/123/EC provides that the Directive entered into force on the
20th day following the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union and it was published on 13 January 2004), the Member States
were obliged to transpose this Directive into national law by 1 January 2005 at
the latest (Art. 2(1) of Council Directive 2003/123/EC).
12. Art. 1(6) of Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003,
amending Council Directive 90/435/EEC (OJ 2004, L7/41).
13. ECJ, Advocate General Mazák’s Opinion, 25 June 2009, Case C-247/08,
Gaz de France – Berliner Investissement SA v. Bundeszentralamt für Steuern,
Paras. 28 and 29.
14. Advocate General Mazák’s Opinion, see note 13, Para. 29; ECJ, 3 April
2008, Case C-27/07, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel, Para. 36 and the case
law cited therein.
15. For example, the introduction of a new legal form in national law after
the entry into force of the Directive.
16. Advocate General Mazák’s Opinion, see note 13, Paras. 33-34.
17. It did not discuss whether or not there was an infringement under
Art. 56 of the EC Treaty (now Art. 63 of the TFEU); the Advocate General
concludes, by reference to ECJ, 10 May 2007, Case C-492/04, Lasertec,
Paras. 20-26, that a minimum holding of 25% in the capital of a subsidiary falls
within the scope of the freedom of establishment; see Advocate General
Mazák’s Opinion, note 13, Para. 44.
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the freedom of establishment prohibits discrimination
based on the place in which a company has its seat.18 In
Mazák’s view, no discrimination exists in this case if a
dividend distributed to an SA is exempt from German
withholding tax, whereas no exemption exists upon a
dividend distribution to an SAS. After all, that distinc-
tion is not based on the seat of the company, but on its
legal form.
3.2. The ECJ’s judgment
After establishing the admissibility of the reference for a
preliminary ruling,19 the ECJ first discussed the two
types of legislative techniques used in the Annex to
define which companies may be considered “companies
of a Member State”. The first technique is to use general
wording. For example, with regard to companies of the
United Kingdom, the definition is: “companies incorpo-
rated under the law of the United Kingdom”; and for
companies of Portugal the same technique is used.20 The
other technique, to explicitly list the applicable legal
forms, is used for the remaining Member States, includ-
ing, therefore, France. The latter legislative technique
does not contain a catch-all clause that would enable it to
be applied to other companies constituted in accordance
with the laws of France. The ECJ concluded that this
“implies that those legal forms are listed exhaustively”.21
This, according to the ECJ, is “apparent from both the
wording and the scheme” of Art. 2(a) and the Annex. The
ECJ held that viewing the list of point (f ) as merely
exemplary is precluded by the “fundamental principle of
legal certainty”, when such an interpretation cannot be
based on a literal or systematic interpretation.
Furthermore, according to the ECJ, the interpretation
that the list in the Annex should be viewed as merely
exemplary can be analysed in light of legislative develop-
ments, in particular, the amendment of the Directive by
Council Directive 2003/123/EC.22
The ECJ then addressed the second question: does the
restriction on the scope of the Directive, i.e. the exclu-
sion of certain companies that are created in accordance
with national law, constitute an infringement of the free-
dom of establishment contained inArts. 43 and 48 of the
EC Treaty (now Arts. 49 and 54 of the TFEU)?23 Such
infringement would be based on “discrimination”
between a dividend distribution to a shareholder having
one of the three listed French legal forms (exempt from
German withholding tax) and a dividend distribution to
an SAS (not exempt). The ECJ first reiterated that the
SAS falls outside the scope of the Directive, and that the
Directive only contains obligations for Member States as
regards profit distributions to companies within the
meaning of the Directive. As regards companies outside
the scope of the Directive, the ECJ held “that it is for the
Member States to determine whether, and to what extent,
economic double taxation of distributed profits is to be
avoided”, provided that they respect EC (now EU) law,
and especially the free movement provisions.24
Articles
131© IBFD EUROPEANTAXATION APRIL 2010
4. Comments
4.1. Interpretationmethods with regard to a“company
of aMember State”
The question as to whether or not an SAS may be
regarded as a “company of a Member State” within the
meaning of the Directive requires an interpretation of
Art. 2(a) of the Directive, as well as the Annex thereto.
When interpreting a directive, the ECJ not only consid-
ers the wording of the relevant provision (literal inter-
pretation), it also takes into account the scheme of the
Directive (schematic interpretation), as well its objective
(teleological interpretation).25 The ECJ may also apply
the historical interpretation method. The ECJ took the
literal interpretation as a starting point. The authors will
comment on each of the interpretation methods in the
following sections.
4.1.1. Literal interpretation
Both the Advocate General and ECJ find support for
their conclusion that an SAS is not covered by the Dir-
ective, as the Annex is exhaustive, in a literal interpreta-
tion of the wording of the Annex.26 The linguistic
research required in this respect is not restricted to “the
ordinary meaning” of a provision, but may also encom-
pass a survey of its “technical”, “legal” or “economic”
meaning.27 The main obstacle of this method of inter-
pretation is the existence of a multitude of official lan-
guage versions, all being equally authentic. The ECJ,
therefore, has to compare all the different language ver-
sions,28 which will often lead the ECJ to conclude that “a
comparison of the different versions of the provisions in
question shows that […] the other versions use different
terms in each of the two articles, with the result that no
18. Advocate General Mazák’s Opinion, see note 13, Para. 45; referring to
ECJ, 22 December 2008, C-282/07, État belge – SPF Finances v. Truck Center
SA, Para. 32 and the case law cited therein.
19. The Italian government had contended that the reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling was inadmissible on the grounds that the ECJ did not have the
required information to assess the comparability of the SAS with the legal
forms that had always been granted an exemption from withholding tax on
dividends under Art. 5(1) of the Directive. The ECJ held that the reference for
a preliminary ruling contained sufficient information on the basis of which
useful answers could be provided to the questions of the referring judge. Fur-
thermore, a comparison between an SAS and an SA would effectively entail an
interpretation of national law, which is not within the competence of the ECJ;
Gaz de France, see note 1, Paras. 22-23.
20. Until 2004: points (k) and (l), now points (v) and (ab) of theAnnex to the
Directive; for Portugal the definition is: “commercial companies or civil law
companies having a commercial form, cooperatives and public undertakings
incorporated in accordance with Portuguese law”.
21. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 32.
22. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 40.
23. In Para. 62 the ECJ states that its conclusion is also valid as regards pro-
visions concerning the free movement of capital (Art. 56 EC Treaty).
24. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 60, and the case law cited therein.
25. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 26.
26. The ECJ uses the literal interpretation method more often; see, inter alia,
ECJ, 14 January 1982, Case 64/81, Nicolaus Corman & Fils SA v. Hauptzollamt
Gronau, where the ECJ relied on a literal interpretation of the term “powder
for the preparation of edible ices”.
27. See, inter alia, J.Mertens deWilmars,“Methodes van Interpretatie van het
Hof van Justitie van de Europese Gemeenschappen”, acceptance speech of the
Jan Tinbergen-leerstoel of the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam in 1990.
28. See, inter alia, ECJ, 6 October 1982, Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanifi-
cio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, Para. 18.
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legal consequences can be based on the terminology
used”. The provision must then be interpreted “by refer-
ence to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of
which it forms a part”.29 Moreover, it is settled case law
that the ECJ will go beyond a literal interpretation if the
outcome reached conflicts with the scheme and objec-
tive of the directive.30 Both Advocate General Mazák
(based on a literal interpretation) and the ECJ (based on
the wording (and the scheme)) conclude that an SAS
cannot be considered a “company of a Member State”.
In the authors’ view, the ECJ did not apply the literal
interpretation method at all since the ECJ did not have
recourse to the ordinary, technical, legal or economic
meaning of a “term” used in secondary EU legislation.
The ECJ had to interpret whether or not a “gap” in the
Annex (the SAS was not listed and the French list did not
contain a catch-all clause) could be viewed as also
encompassing an SAS. The ECJ’s “literal” interpretation
in Gaz de France is, therefore, best regarded as a
schematic interpretation.
4.1.2. Legal certainty prohibits otherwise
The ECJ finds support for its “literal” (which the authors
contend) or “restrictive” interpretation in the principle of
legal certainty. The ECJ is not known for embracing the
literal interpretation method. Instead, the ECJ seems to
prefer the schematic and teleological methods of inter-
pretation. The ECJ is, therefore, often – perhaps erro-
neously31 – accused of being too active and pushing the
boundaries of its competencies.32 Even ECJ Judge Rosas
confirms that:
it is common place to hold that the ECJ follows a “teleological”
method of interpretation advancing the general objective of
European integration and the more specific objectives of EU
primary and secondary law.33
The advantage of such a liberal method of interpretation
is that it can take into account the evolving nature of law
and new needs that did not exist at the moment of legis-
lating;34 for instance, the introduction of the SAS as a
new legal form. The disadvantage of such a liberal
method of interpretation is that it gives rise to legal
uncertainty.35
With regard to secondary EU law Judge Rosas indicates
that:
with the development of secondary legislation, the methods of
interpretation of the EU courts have become more textual. They
often refer to a combination of textual (literal), contextual (sys-
temic) and teleological interpretations.36
The ECJ has recognized the principle of legal certainty as
a general principle of law.37 The ECJ has ruled, in partic-
ular, that the provisions of Regulation 44/2001, which
lays down rules governing the jurisdiction of courts in
civil and commercial matters:38
must be strictly interpreted and cannot be given an interpreta-
tion going beyond the cases expressly envisaged, [as] the prin-
ciple of legal certainty […] is one of the objectives of [that] Reg-
ulation.39
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Although legal certainty is not one of the objectives of
the Directive, it still remains a general principle of law.40
In that light it is not surprising that the ECJ interprets the
Directive in a restrictive way. Perhaps it is correct to do
so, given that the Directive involves detailed secondary
EU legislation rather than primary EU law with open
norms.
In Gaz de France, similar to cases such as Kühne &
Heitz,41 the Court confirmed that the principle of legal
certainty may also be advantageous to the tax inspector.
As Rasmussen puts it:
[a]lso governments who are subjects of the law on which the
European Court expounds, should benefit […] from the ideal of
legal certainty.42
4.1.3. Schematic interpretation
When the ECJ undertakes a schematic interpretation of
a provision, it places the disputed provision within the
system/scheme of rules of which it forms a part. In Gaz
de France, the schematic interpretation of the ECJ
revolved around a distinction between the two legisla-
tive techniques used in the Annex. The first technique
29. ECJ, 27 October 1977, Case 30/77, Régina v. Pierre Bouchereau.
30. ECJ, 28 February 1980, Case 67/79, Waldemar Fellinger v. Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit, Nuremberg.
31. SeeA.Albors-Llorens,“The European Court of Justice:More than a Tele-
ological Court”, The Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies 2 (1999),
p. 373.
32. See H.C.F.J.A. de Waele, “Tussen activisme en ongehoorzaamheid. Het
Europese Hof op de grenzen van de rechtspleging”, in L.E. de Groot-van
Leeuwen, A.M.A.P. van den Bossche, Y. Buruma (eds.), De ongehoorzame
rechter: rechters versus andere rechters, de wetgever, de bevolking en het Europees
recht (Deventer: Kluwer, 2006), p. 207.
33. A. Rosas, Statement by Judge Rosas to the Committee of Legal Advisers
on Public International Law (CAHDI) during their 30th meeting in Stras-
bourg, 19-20 September 2005 (Strasbourg, 15/09/05, CAHDI (2005) 15).
34. A. Kaczorowska, European Union Law (Oxford/New York: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2008), p. 244.
35. P. Blok, Patentrettens Konsumtionsprincip (Copenhagen: Juristforbundet,
1974); the translation and further analysis was given by C. Gulmann, “Meth-
ods of Interpretation of the Court of Justice”, Scandinavian Studies in Law
(1980), p. 198.
36. A. Rosas, see note 33.
37. ECJ, 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino, Para. 44.
38. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdic-
tion and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
39. ECJ, 13 July 2006, C-103/05, Reisch Montage AG v. Kiesel Baumaschinen
Handels GmbH, Paras. 23-24 and ECJ, 22 May 2008, Case C-462/06, Glaxo-
smithkline, Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v. Jean-Pierre Rouard, Para. 33.
40. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union
has replaced and succeeded the European Community (Art. 1(3) EU Treaty
(as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon)); in the authors’ view, the ECJ will, there-
fore, switch from the use of the terminology “general principles of Community
law” to the terminology “general principles of law”; the ECJ used the latter ter-
minology already in cases under the former second and third pillars of the EU
Treaty (see ECJ, 27 February 2007, Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga, Aritza Galar-
raga v. Council of the European Union, Para. 51 (the former second pillar) and
ECJ, 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van
de Ministerraad, Para. 45 (the former third pillar)); see W.W. Geursen, “Non-
discriminatie onder het EU- en Euratom-Verdrag: de doorwerking van
artikel 12 EG-Verdrag (thans art. 18 VWEU)”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor
Europees Recht 1 (2010), p.17, especially pp. 25-26.
41. ECJ, 13 January 2004, Case C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz NV and
Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, Para. 24.
42. H. Rasmussen, On law and policy in the European Court of Justice: a com-
parative study in judicial policymaking (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, 1986), p. 36; this study gives an extensive overview of the views of scholars
on the tension between the ‘active’ role of the ECJ when ‘making’ law in its case
law and the principle of legal certainty.
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involves a reference to incorporation under the laws of
the respective Member State, whereas the second legisla-
tive technique lists the qualifying legal forms. Under the
main technique used in the initial version of the Dir-
ective to determine a “company of a Member State” no
reference was made to incorporation under the laws of
that Member State; the qualifying legal forms were
explicitly listed.
Based on the distinction between the two legislative
techniques, the ECJ deduces that the main technique
implies that the list of legal forms is exhaustive, rather
than exemplary, as Gaz de France had argued.
In the authors’ view, the mere observation that the initial
version of the Annex did not refer to incorporation
under the laws of France does not necessarily mean that
the “French” list should be interpreted exhaustively.After
all, such reasoning is based on the a contrario argument
that, by not including a clause referring to incorporation
under the laws of France, only a company with one of the
three listed legal forms may qualify as a “company of
France”. If, upon adoption of the Directive in 1990, the
three listed legal forms were all non-transparent legal
forms existing under French company law, the relevant
provisions of the Directive may also be interpreted as
encompassing all non-transparent legal forms under
French law, including future non-transparent legal
forms, such as the SAS. This view would be based on the
(implicit) intention of the legislator to bring all non-
transparent legal forms under the scope of the Directive.
Furthermore, although the preamble to Council Dir-
ective 2003/123/EC43 states that the scope of the Dir-
ective should be extended to companies such as the SAS,
this does not automatically imply that an SAS did not
previously qualify as a “company of a Member State”
under the Directive. Clearly, one may argue that the
explicit inclusion of both the SAS and a clause referring
to incorporation under the laws of France in Directive
2003/123/EC may be regarded as confirmation that,
under the Directive, the SAS could not qualify as “a com-
pany of a Member State”. On the other hand, it may be
argued that the amendments introduced by Directive
2003/123/EC merely clarify that an SAS, based on pri-
mary EC (now EU) law, could already be considered a
“company of a Member State” under the Directive.
Finally, as Wolvers argued, the fact that the SAS is
included in Directive 2003/123/EC may also illustrate
that the slow legislative process was the sole reason why
the SAS was not previously listed in the Annex.44 In the
authors’ view, a simple solution would be to provide for a
comitology procedure for amending the list in the
Annex.45
4.1.4. Interpretation in the light of the EC Treaty
An example of where secondary legislation was
amended due to an infringement of primary EC (now
EU) law is also found in Directive 2003/123/EC. Under
the Directive, situations involving permanent establish-
ments (PEs) were not explicitly covered, although on the
basis of primary EC (now EU) law (the freedom of estab-
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lishment underArts. 43 or 48 of the EC Treaty (nowArts.
49 and 54 of the TFEU), as interpreted by the ECJ in
Avoir fiscal46 and Saint-Gobain),47 it could be argued that
these situations fell within the scope of the Directive.
Directive 2003/123/EC, therefore, explicitly covers such
situations.48 Based on the codification of non-discrimi-
nation of PEs in Directive 2003/123/EC, it may, there-
fore, be argued that the words“and other companies con-
stituted under French law subject to French corporate
[income] tax” in Directive 2003/123/EC merely support
the conclusion under primary EC (now EU) law that all
companies subject to French corporation tax also had
access to the Directive.
In this light, reference can be made to settled case law of
the ECJ that if the wording of secondary legislation (i.e.
the Directive) is open to more than one interpretation,
preference should be given to the interpretation that is in
conformity with primary EC (now EU) law, rather than
an interpretation that is incompatible with the EC Treaty
(TFEU).49 On the basis of that rule, the ECJ should have
interpreted the term “company of a Member State” in the
light of Art. 48 of the EC Treaty (now Art. 54 of the
TFEU), which provides that:
‘[c]ompanies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted
under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies,
and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save
for those which are non-profit-making.
In conjunction with Art. 2(c) of the Directive, the ECJ
should then have interpreted the term “company of a
Member State” as encompassing any profit-making com-
pany under civil or commercial law of that Member State
that is subject to corporate income tax.
4.1.5. Teleological interpretation
The ECJ commenced its teleological interpretation with
the admission that Gaz de France’s argument (viewing
the list as merely exemplary) would indeed extend the
43. Council Directive of 22 December 2003 on the common system of taxa-
tion applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different
Member States (2003/123/EC), which amended the Parent-Subsidiary Dir-
ective.
44. S. Wolvers, “Lijst van onder de Moeder-dochterrichtlijn vallende ven-
nootschappen is uitputtend”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal Recht (2009),
p. 1555.
45. This was also the situation in regards to Council Directive 85/511/EEC
of 18 November 1985 introducing Community measures for the control of
foot-and-mouth disease (OJ 1985 L 315, p. 11), as amended by Council Dir-
ective 90/423/EEC of 26 June 1990 (OJ 1990 L 224, p. 13), annexed to which
was a list of laboratories per Member State that were approved as being able to
officially ascertain foot-and-mouth disease; see ECJ, 15 June 2006, Case
C-28/05,G.J. Dokter, Maatschap Van den Top, W. Boekhout v. Minister van Land-
bouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, Para. 9.
46. ECJ, 28 January 1986, Case 270/83,Commission of the European Commu-
nities v. French Republic (“Avoir fiscal”).
47. ECJ, 21 September 1999, Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain,
Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt.
48. Directive 2003/123/EC,Art. 1(1). See, inter alia, Para. 19 of the Explana-
tory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive amending the Par-
ent-Subsidiary Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Mem-
ber States, COM (2003) 462 final, 2003/0179 (CNS) of 29 July 2003.
49. ECJ, 13 December 1983, Case 218/82, Commission of the European Com-
munities v. Council of the European Communities, Para. 15 and ECJ, 29 June
1995, Case C-135/93, Kingdom of Spain v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, Para. 37.
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scope of the Directive and thereby contribute to the aim
of the Directive. The ECJ held, however, that “the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive does not seek to introduce a com-
mon system for all companies of the Member States nor
for all holdings”.50
The authors believe that the ECJ, by completing its teleo-
logical interpretation with the statement that the Dir-
ective “does not seek to introduce a common system for
all companies of the Member States nor for all holdings”,
did not put sufficient effort into its analysis in this area.
Based on the objective of the Directive, which is the
avoidance of economic double taxation that occurs if
both the distributing company and the receiving com-
pany are faced with corporate income tax and withhold-
ing tax on the same profit, the ECJ should, in the authors’
view, have reached a different outcome. As double taxa-
tion only occurs if the parent company is taxed on the
profits received, the ECJ should have concluded that
only entities that are not subject to corporate income tax
on the profits received were to be excluded from the
scope of the Directive.51
4.1.6. Historical interpretation
In addition to the literal, systematic and teleological
interpretation methods, the ECJ may also apply the his-
torical interpretation method.52 Historical interpretation
entails a review of documents that are part of the legisla-
tive process that led to the adoption of the Directive
(“travaux préparatoires” or “preparatory works”). In this
respect, the ECJ has held that the historical method of
interpretation “is not sufficient in itself and cannot be
decisive, because it plays only a subsidiary role in the
interpretation of Community law.”53 In general, the ECJ
had always been reluctant to rely on preparatory works,
as preparatory works were not published.54 Following
the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public
access to documents,55 however, and the launch of
PreLex,56 both increasing the availability of preparatory
works to the public, the ECJ has acknowledged, to a
greater extent, the importance it attaches to the prepara-
tory works.
The ECJ held that, on the basis of legal certainty, the fact
that certain Member States have expressed their wish to
only exclude partnerships from the sphere of the Dir-
ective, a point argued by Gaz de France, is not legally rel-
evant if these wishes are not expressed in legislation. The
authors can understand the ECJ’s reluctance to rely on
expressions of intent that have not been expressed in leg-
islation. As the ECJ held in Epson Europe BV:
according to settled case-law, declarations recorded in Council
minutes in the course of preparatory work […] cannot be used
for the purpose of interpreting that directive where no reference
is made to the content of the declaration in the wording of the
provision in question, and, moreover, such declarations have no
legal significance.57
Furthermore, in Gaz de France, the ECJ had recourse to
“legislative developments and, in particular […] Dir-
ective 2003/123”, in“legitimizing” its view.58 The ECJ thus
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could deduce the legislator’s intent in 1990 from an
analysis of the intention of the 2003 amendment.
On 20August 1993, the Commission adopted a Proposal
to enable the Directive to be applied to all companies
subject to corporate income tax;59 however, according to
the Commission proposal from which Directive
2003/123/EC originated: “the asymmetries found in
commercial law governing the legal types of entities and
the diversity of tax arrangements applicable to them in
theMember States”would create“considerable problems”
if the Directive were to be extended to all enterprises
resident and subject to corporation tax.60 Instead, it was
proposed that the list be extended to cover new named
legal types.
When interpreting the Directive, one should be cautious
in referring to documents relating to proposals for the
amendment of the Directive, as the wording used in such
proposals will often be “tainted”. It appears that the rea-
son why the scope of the Directive was not extended to
all companies subject to tax was not of a fundamental
nature, but rather of a political nature.As indicated in the
Report by the European Parliament on the 2003 Pro-
50. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 36.
51. Such a broad interpretation, based on the objective of a directive, was
applied, for instance, in the Dokter case concerning Council Dir-
ective 85/511/EEC of 18 November 1985 introducing Community measures
for the control of foot-and-mouth disease (OJ 1985 L 315, p. 11). Annexed to
this directive was a list of laboratories per Member State that were approved as
being able to officially diagnose foot-and-mouth disease, after which the sick
animals were to be slaughtered on the spot. In the Dokter case, the question
arose as to whether or not the slaughtering of animals as a result of confirma-
tion of the disease by a laboratory with a different legal entity than the one
listed for the Netherlands in the Annex was legal. According to the ECJ the
objective of that directive is effective control of foot-and-mouth disease. This
requires a broad interpretation of the term ‘laboratory’, which does not mean
that the slaughtering measures may be taken only after diagnosis by a labora-
tory included in the list in the annex to that directive. See Dokter, note 45,
Paras. 51 and 52.
52. Court of First Instance, 7 November 2007, Case T-374/04, Federal
Republic of Germany v. Commission of the European Communities, Para. 92.
53. ECJ, Advocate General’s Opinion, 15 November 2007, Case C-404/46,
Quelle AG v. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherver-
bände, Para. 59.
54. See N. Dhondt and W. Geursen, “Over gedeelde bevoegdheden en
hiërarchie in interpretatiemethoden”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees
Recht 10 (2008), p. 276.
55. Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Com-
mission documents.
56. http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm.
57. ECJ, 8 June 2008, Case C-375/98, Ministério Público and Fazenda Pública
v. Epson Europe BV, Para. 26, citing ECJ, 26 February 1991, Case C-292/89,The
Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Desiderius Antonissen,
Para. 18 and ECJ, 13 February 1996, Joined Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94,
Société Bautiaa v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux des Landes and Société Française
Maritime v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Finistère, Para. 51.
58. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 41.
59. Proposal for a Council Directive amending the Parent-Subsidiary Dir-
ective of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, COM
(93) 293 final,OJ C 225 of 20August 1993.The recommendation to extend the
scope of the Directive to companies subject to tax was prompted by the final
report from the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation,
chaired by Onno Ruding (1992).
60. Proposal for a Council Directive amending the Parent-Subsidiary Dir-
ective of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, COM
(2003) 462 final, 2003/0179 (CNS) of 29 July 2003.
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posal,61 the proposal to extend the scope of the Directive
to all companies subject to tax received the full support
of the European Parliament, but was eventually aban-
doned by the Council in 1997 due to disagreement stem-
ming from certain differences as a result of which some
entities would be regarded as transparent in one Mem-
ber State and non-transparent in another Member State
(hybrid entities).
Although the Report by the European Parliament
referred to the “abandonment” of the proposal to extend
the Directive to all companies subject to tax, the updated
list of companies in theAnnex to Directive 2003/123/EC
indicates otherwise. Of the (then) 15 Member States
listed, the paragraphs of nine Member States contained a
catch-all clause, which ensured that, in addition to
companies having the listed legal forms, a company hav-
ing a non-listed legal form constituted under the law of
that Member State, which was subject to corporate
income tax in that Member State, could also be regarded
as a “company of that Member State”.62 For four Member
States the requirements were even less strict: it was suffi-
cient if a company was incorporated under the laws of
that Member Sate, or was a “commercial” company.63 The
“old technique” of exclusively listing the qualifying legal
forms only applied with respect to Sweden and Finland
(two out of the (then) 15 Member States).64
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Commission held
in 2004 that an SAS did not fall within the scope of the
Directive as it was not listed.65 Surprisingly, the Commis-
sion completely reversed its position in Gaz de France by
adhering to Gaz de France’s view that a dividend distri-
bution to an SAS should be exempt from withholding
tax.66
4.2. Unequal treatment and (in)validity of the
Directive
In the Ouzo case, the ECJ held that “measures of the
Community institutions are in principle presumed to be
lawful”, but if those measures are “tainted by an irregular-
ity whose gravity is so obvious that it cannot be tolerated
by the Community legal order they must be treated as
having no legal effect”. The finding that a measure is
without legal effect “might be reserved for quite extreme
situations”.67
As Gaz de France submitted, the exclusion, from the out-
set, of an SAS from the scope of the Directive constitutes
a disadvantageous treatment of an SAS in comparison to
an SA. According to the ECJ, the disadvantageous treat-
ment in itself is not unlawful as:
the Community legislature has a wide discretion in relation to
the harmonisation and approximation of legislation, [therefore]
restricting the scope of the harmonisation and approximation of
legislation to certain fields […] cannot, in itself, be unlawful.68
As the obligation to avoid economic double taxation of
profits is placed on the Member States only as regards
companies within the meaning of the Directive, the
Member States may determine themselves whether or
not, and to what extent, economic double taxation of
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profits is avoided as regards companies outside the scope
of the Directive. These measures, however, may not con-
flict with the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the
EC Treaty (now TFEU).69 According to the ECJ, the
exclusion from the outset of other companies created
under national law does not restrict the freedom of
establishment.
The ECJ seems to consider the exclusion (or non-inclu-
sion) of the SAS in the Directive as inherent to the
process of gradual harmonization.70 The Advocate Gen-
eral only mentions that the free movement provisions
prohibit a distinction on the basis of the seat of the com-
pany, which leads to (indirect) discrimination on the
basis of nationality and that no such discrimination
exists in respect of a distinction between two different
corporate entities of the same Member State. Although
the views of the ECJ and the Advocate General are cor-
rect, the authors believe that they have erroneously neg-
lected reviewing a breach of the principle of equality. As
some scholars have argued, the incomplete coverage of
entities may constitute discrimination.71 In their view,
the unequal treatment of one entity compared to another
infringes the principle of equality and non-discrimina-
tion; a general principle of Community law72 and a gen-
61. Report on the proposal for a Council Directive amending the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive on the common system of taxation applicable in the case
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States
(COM(2003) 462 – C5 – 0427/2003 – 2003/0179(CNS)) of 5 December 2003.
62. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Austria.
63. Ireland, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and currently also Lithua-
nia.
64. Currently also the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic; for Cyprus and Bulgaria
the authors were not able to establish with certainty which technique was
used, but the Annex seems to use the technique of listing the companies by
their names only.
65. Answer of Commissioner Bolkestein, on behalf of the Commission, in
reply to theWritten Questions P-2823/03 by Françoise Grossête (PPE-DE) to
the Commission (OJ 2004, C78 E/175).
66. The Commission’s point of view is found, for instance, in Gaz de France,
note 1, Paras. 34, 35, 39 and 43.
67. ECJ, 5 October 2004, Case C-475/01, Commission of the European Com-
munities v. Hellenic Republic (“Ouzo”), Paras. 18-20, and the case law cited
therein.
68. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 47.
69. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 60, citing, inter alia, ECJ, 18 June 2009,
Case C-303/07, Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha Oy, Para. 28; see also Y.
Robert, S. Lauratet, P. Tredaniel, A. Reillac, “DividendWithholding Tax Levied
on Investment Funds: Aberdeen and its Implications in France”, European
Taxation 12 (2009), pp. 606-610.
70. The ECJ has previously held that gradual harmonization does not result
in illegal discrimination: see, for instance, ECJ, 18 April 1991, Case C-63/89,
Les Assurances du Crédit SA and Compagnie Belge d’Assurance Crédit SA v.
Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Com-
munities, Para. 23 concerning Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions
relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other
than life assurance (OJ 1973, L228/3), as amended by Council Dir-
ective 87/343/EEC of 22 June 1987 (OJ 1987, L185/72).
71. See Kofler, note 7, p. 493, citing B.H. ter Kuile, “Taxation, Discrimination
and the Internal Market”, 32 European Taxation 12 (1992), p. 402 and C.M.
Harris, “The European Community’s Parent-Subsidiary Directive”, 9 Florida
Journal of International Law (1994), p. 111; see, for a general overview of har-
monizing measures that infringe the principle of equal treatment, T. Tridimas,
The General Principles of EC Law (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1999),
p. 62 et seq.
72. ECJ, 12 September 2006, Case C-300/04, M.G. Eman and O.B. Sevinger v.
College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag, Para. 57.
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eral principle of law.73 This principle has been applied by
the ECJ where there has been, “an arbitrary or unjustifi-
ably unequal treatment of two persons within an area of
Community competence.”74
Such unequal treatment exists in regards to the differ-
ence in treatment between an SA and an SAS. Both entit-
ies hold the same “nationality” as they are both incorpo-
rated under the laws of France.75 Contrary to the
principle of equality, they are, nevertheless, treated dif-
ferently.
The existence of a breach of this principle seems to be
confirmed by the preamble to Directive 2005/19/EC,76
amending Directive 90/434/EEC,77 theMerger Directive.
It provides that:
certain forms of company are not listed in that Annex, even
though they are resident for tax purposes in a Member State and
are subject to corporation tax there. In the light of the experi-
ence, this appears to be an unjustifiable lacuna.
The Annex to the Merger Directive was almost identical
to the Annex to the Directive.78 The same analysis
should, therefore, apply to the Directive.
In the Gaz de France case, the ECJ did not elaborate
explicitly on possible justification grounds. In the
authors’ view it did, however, implicitly do so by referring
to the discretion of the EU legislator to harmonize grad-
ually.79 In the Arcelor case the ECJ elaborated extensively
on the (strict) conditions under which such unequal
treatment in secondary EU law is objectively justified.80
The gradual harmonization – in Arcelor the ECJ named
this the “step-by-step approach” – is one of those justifi-
cation grounds. The ECJ held that:
[a] difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objec-
tive and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a
legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and
it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment.81
The burden of proof of objective justification is on the
EU legislator.82 In the Arcelor case, the ECJ accepted a
step-by-step approach by the EU legislator provided that
it reviews the measures adopted at reasonable intervals.83
One might argue that the EU legislator fulfilled this pro-
viso in the case of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive with
the 2003 amendment, although too late for the SAS.
Another acceptable objective justification ground might
be found in difficulties of harmonization, as was the case
in the Francovich II case.84 In Gaz de France the ECJ
seems – again implicitly – to refer to such difficulties as
well in the field of direct taxation as this concerns the
harmonization of diverse and complex national provi-
sions.85
When it comes to justifying the different treatment in
the Gaz de France case, the ECJ should, in the authors’
view, have given a more explicit reasoning as it did, for
example, in the Arcelor and Francovich II cases; unsatisfy-
ingly, it now only did so implicitly.
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4.3. ReconcilingGaz de Francewith the ECJ’s earlier
case law
4.3.1. Gradual harmonization
In recent years, the ECJ has issued several judgments in
which it ruled on the scope of the Directive. Such cases
include Denkavit86(temporal scope), Les Vergers du Vieux
Tauves,87 Amurta88 (material scope) and Aberdeen (per-
sonal scope).89 The judgments in these cases follow a
clear pattern: first, the ECJ will uphold the validity (in
light of the fundamental freedoms) of the Directive.
According to the ECJ, the mere fact that certain transac-
tions are covered by that Directive, whereas others are
not, is not in itself, according to the ECJ, a restriction of
73. With respect to the third EU pillar: ECJ, 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05,
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, Paras. 45-46.
74. See P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law, Texts, Cases, and Materials
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 559-560, citing, inter alia, ECJ, 19
October 1977, Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77, Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. et
Hansa-Lagerhaus Ströh & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen; Diamalt AG
v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, Para. 7. See also Eman and Sevinger, note 72, Para. 61,
in which the ECJ held that although no discrimination regarding nationality
exists when Dutch citizens resident in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are
excluded from the general suffrage for the European Parliament, whilst Dutch
citizens resident in third countries are not excluded, this difference in treat-
ment is contrary to the (general) principle of equality.
75. ECJ, 16 December 2008, C-210/06, CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató bt,
Para. 123.
76. Council Directive 2005/19/EC of 17 February 2005, amending Dir-
ective 90/434/EEC 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to
mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning
companies of different Member States (OJ 2005, L58/19).
77. Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system
of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges
of shares concerning companies of different Member States (OJ 1990,
L225/1).
78. Consideration 10 of the Preamble to Directive 2005/19/EC; this consid-
eration contains almost the same wording as consideration 4 of the Preamble
to Directive 2003/123/EC, except that in that case no reference was made to
the unjustifiable lacuna.
79. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 52.
80. ECJ, 16 December 2008,Case C-127/07, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lor-
raine and Others v. Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Écologie et du Développement
durable and Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, Para. 57 et seq.;
in this case the question arose as to whether the inclusion of the steel sector
and the exclusion of the plastics and aluminium industries – which produce to
a certain extent competing products (substitutes) – from the greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading scheme under Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003, L 275/32) was a breach of
equal treatment; according to the ECJ there was a breach which was objecti-
vely justified; See F. Donnat, “Principe d’égalité et mise en oeuvre expérimen-
tale d’un système d’échanges de quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de serre: quel
degré de contrôle pour la Cour de justice?”, Revue juridique de l’Economie
publique (2009) No. 664, pp. 22-24.
81. Arcelor, see note 80, Para. 47 and the case law cited therein.
82. Arcelor, see note 80, Para. 48 and the case law cited therein.
83. Arcelor, see note 80, Paras. 61 and 62
84. ECJ, 9 November 1995, Case C-479/93, Andrea Francovich v. Italian
Republic, Para. 28; this is the second Francovich case; the first was Case C-6/90.
In this case the difficulty was caused by finding a concept of insolvency capa-
ble of unambiguous application in the different Member States; a distinction
caused by the harmonized definition of insolvency, which caused unequal
treatment, was justified due to the difficulty mentioned.
85. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 52.
86. ECJ, 14 December 2006, Case C-170/05, Denkavit Internationaal BV and
Denkavit France SARL v. Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie.
87. ECJ, 22 December 2008, Case C-48/0, État belge – Service public federal
Finances v. Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves SA.
88. ECJ, 8 November 2007,Case C-379/05,Amurta SGPS v. Inspecteur van de
Belastingdienst/Amsterdam.
89. The ECJ judges in the Aberdeen case were the same judges as in the Gaz
de France case.
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the fundamental freedoms, as it is inherent to the process
of gradual harmonization in the field of direct taxation
(see 4.2.). After establishing that a certain transaction is
outside of the scope of the Directive, the ECJ will reiter-
ate its mantra that if a situation is not covered by the Dir-
ective, it is up to the Member States, either unilaterally or
through conventions, to provide for relief for double
taxation. When Member States provide such relief, they
may not restrict the freedom of establishment/free
movement of capital by treating a cross-border dividend
distribution less favourably than a domestic dividend
distribution.
4.3.2. Gaz de France andAberdeen
In both Gaz de France and Aberdeen the ECJ had to
determine whether or not a company having a non-listed
legal form (in Gaz de France an SAS and in Aberdeen a
SICAV) could qualify as a “company of a Member State”.
In both cases, the ECJ’s conclusion was negative.
Subsequently, the ECJ had to determine whether or not a
restriction on the freedom of establishment existed. In
Gaz de France, the ECJ held that an unfavourable treat-
ment of an SAS compared to an SA does not constitute a
restriction on the freedom of establishment that would
potentially invalidate the Directive; whereas an
unfavourable treatment under national law of an SAS
compared to a comparable German entity would.90 In
this respect, the ECJ referred to settled case law91 regard-
ing the freedom of establishment, which provides that
the Member State of establishment (“host state”) may not
impose any restrictions on nationals of another Member
State (“state of origin”) that set up agencies, branches or
subsidiaries in that host state.92
In Gaz de France, the ECJ did not actually examine
whether or not an SAS was treated less favourably than a
comparable German entity. Instead, the ECJ left that
analysis to the referring German Court. In Aberdeen,
however, the ECJ did address the comparability of a Lux-
embourg SICAV to a Finnish parent company. In this
respect, the ECJ held that, in order to assess the compa-
rability of two legal forms, these forms need not neces-
sarily be identical, “as the company law of the Member
States has not been fully harmonized at Community
level”.93 Requiring that these forms be identical would
thus “deprive the freedom of establishment of all effec-
tiveness”.94
Interestingly, this consideration was interpreted by the
Dutch legislator as meaning that the legal form require-
ment in the Directive is irrelevant. From 1 January 2010,
the legal form requirement is, therefore, removed from
Art. 4 of the Dutch Dividend Withholding Tax Act.95 In
the authors’ view, this change seems premature after the
ECJ’s judgment in Gaz de France, but rational in light of
Aberdeen.
Furthermore, it is settled case law of the ECJ that if a
Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a tax
treaty, imposes withholding tax not only on resident
shareholders, but also on non-resident shareholders, the
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position of non-resident shareholders is comparable to
that of the resident shareholders.96
The question that remains, is whether or not the SAS can
only claim the same treatment as comparable German
parent companies (the Aberdeen “solution” providing for
“national treatment”), or whether it could also claim the
same treatment as an SA under German national law.
The favourable treatment of an SA follows from the
national German legislation transposing the Directive.
In other words: can it be concluded that the national leg-
islation transposing the Directive is contrary to the free-
dom of establishment (Art. 49 TFEU) or to the general
principle of equality, even in the event the Directive is
not invalidated (although the correctness of that conclu-
sion is doubtful in the authors’ view (see 4.2.))?97 In order
to answer that question, it is relevant in the authors’ view
to consider whether the breach of EU law by national
legislation transposing a directive is imputable to the
Member State. In the Deutsche Bahn case the Court of
First Instance (CFI) had to rule – in the field of State aid
– whether the exemption of kerosene from excise duties
constituted State aid to airline companies.98 The exemp-
tion was imposed on the Member States by a directive.99
Therefore, the CFI concluded that the national measure
at issue:
[wa]s not imputable to [a Member] State, but in actual fact
stem[med] from an act of the Community legislature.100
In the authors’ view there is no valid argument why this
analysis should not apply mutatis mutandis in the field of
the free movement provisions.101
Consequently, if the national measure (correctly) trans-
poses a directive, the national measure itself cannot be
held contrary to EU law as the measure is not imputable
90. Gaz de France, see note 1, Para. 59.
91. Most recently: Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha Oy, see note 69.
92. Gaz de France, note 1, Para. 54, citing, inter alia, ECJ, 23 February 2006,
Case C-253/03, CLT-UFA SA v. Finanzamt Köln-West, Para. 13.
93. Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha Oy, see note 69.
94. Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha Oy, see note 69, Para. 50. See also Y.
Robert et al., note 69.
95. Artikelsgewijze toelichting OFM, Belastingplan 2010, Art. V, part A
(Art. 4 of the 1965 Law on the Taxation of Dividends – Wet op de dividendbe-
lasting 1965), pp. 40-42.
96. See, inter alia, Amurta, note 88, Para. 38 and the case law cited therein.
97. It should be noted that if the national legislation transposing a directive
were to be tested against EU law, the directive is (indirectly) tested (as well),
although through the backdoor.
98. CFI, 5 April 2006, Case T-351/02,Deutsche Bahn AG v. Commission of the
European Communities.
99. Council Directive 92/81/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation
of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils (OJ 1992, L316/12); this
exemption is in line with international practice following from, for example,
for the Chicago Convention of 7 December 1944 on International Civil Avia-
tion (United Nations Treaty Series,Vol. 15, p. 295).
100. Deutsche Bahn, see note 98, Para. 102.
101. Although the ECJ did not accept it in a case in the field of the free move-
ment (of capital), in which Belgium used the argument that the restrictive
measure was not imputable to it, because “the contested measure was taken by
the Belgian State not in its capacity as a public authority but in its capacity as a
private operator”.
The ECJ did not accept this argument, because the restrictive measure consti-
tuted “a regulatory measure which only the State in its capacity as public
authority is authorised to take”. In the authors’ view, that case is not relevant
here, as the national measure did not transpose a directive. ECJ, 26 September
2000, Case C-478/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of
Belgium, Para. 20 et seq.
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to the Member State.102 In that event, only the measure,
i.e. the directive, enacted by the Union legislator can be
tested against EU law and, if contrary, invalidated. This is
confirmed by settled case law of the ECJ in the field of
harmonization in which the ECJ holds that national leg-
islation that is in conformity with directives cannot be
regarded as infringing primary EU law.103
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion would be that an
SAS cannot claim the same treatment under German law
as an SA based on the argument that the German
national law, transposing the Directive, is contrary to the
freedom of establishment or to general principle of
equality.
5. Implications of Gaz de France
5.1. Limited scope of the Directive
In Gaz de France and Aberdeen, the ECJ clearly sets forth a
(limited) personal scope of the Directive. Companies that
fall outside that scope may, however, be protected by the
freedom of establishment, which guarantees them a simi-
lar treatment to a comparable national entity.As discussed
above, the ECJ held in Aberdeen that differences between
the legal forms of foreign parent companies and domestic
parent companies are, to a large extent, irrelevant.
5.2. The catch-all clause as themain legislative
technique
In Gaz de France, the ECJ attached importance to the fact
that the main legislative technique used in the initial
Annex was the explicit listing of qualifying legal forms.
From its schematic interpretation, the ECJ concluded
that the list in the Annex was exhaustive rather than
merely exemplary.
With the 2003 amendment, the catch-all clause has
become the main legislative technique used in the
Annex.When applying a schematic interpretation to the
amended Annex, it may be argued that since the main
technique is the catch-all clause, the list in the Annex has
become exemplary rather than exhaustive.
5.3. Dual-resident companies and the catch-all clause
The majority of the catch-all clauses require, in order for
a an entity to be characterized as a “company of a Mem-
ber State”, that (1) the company be incorporated under
the law of a Member State and (2) the company be sub-
ject to corporate income tax in the same Member State.
The catch-all clauses prevent the undesired exclusion of
new legal forms from the scope of the Directive, such as
the SAS in Gaz de France.104
As far as the authors are aware, the ECJ has not yet inter-
preted the term ‘subject to tax’ contained in the Annex to
the Directive, nor has it interpreted the same term used
in Art. 2(c) of that Directive.105 Two different interpreta-
tions of the term “subject to tax” have been put forward
by scholars:106
(1) the (form of the) company must be subject to tax,
regardless of whether or not the company actually
pays tax;107 and
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(2) the profit realized by the company must be subject to
tax (which makes the company “fully liable to
tax”).108
The authors are of the opinion that these two interpreta-
tions of the term ‘subject to tax’ in Art. 2(c) of the Dir-
ective can also be used for the catch-all clause in the
Annex.
Using the fully-liable-to-tax interpretation may have an
adverse impact on dual-resident companies. For exam-
ple, consider a company that is incorporated by way of a
new (i.e. a non-listed) Dutch legal form. Further, assume
that the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act has also been
extended to include that legal form. Pursuant to the
catch-all clause in the “Dutch” paragraph in the Annex,
that company will have a qualifying legal form if it is
“constituted under Dutch law subject to Dutch corporate
[income] tax”.109 If the real seat of that company is trans-
ferred to, for instance, Germany (see the Überseering
case),110 the company will become a dual-resident com-
pany. Pursuant to Dutch tax law, the company will tech-
nically remain subject to Dutch corporate income tax, as
it is incorporated under the law of the Netherlands, but it
will no longer be “fully liable to tax” in the Netherlands.
Pursuant to German tax law, the company will become
subject to German corporate income tax, as its real
seat/place of its effective management is in Germany.111
102. Of course this situation should be distinguished from cases where there
is, for example, minimum harmonization, in which case national legislation
going beyond the minimum harmonized norms can still be tested against pri-
mary EU law; see for example: ECJ, 14 July 1998,Case C-389/96,Aher-Waggon
GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Paras. 15 and 16. See also: Y. Hofhuis,
Minimumharmonisatie in het Europees recht: vormen, begrip en gevolgen,
Europese monografieën Vol. 83 (Deventer: Kluwer, 2006), p. 126 and Kofler,
note 7, p. 480.
103. See Kofler, note 7, p. 479 and ECJ, 11 June 1987, Case 241/86, Openbaar
Ministerie v. Jacques Bodin and Établissements Minguet & Thomas, Para. 13.
104. J.N. Bouwman and M.G. deWeerdt-de Jong, “Richtlijn 2003/123/EG; de
aanpassing van de moeder-dochterrichtlijn”, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1597
(2004).
105. Neither has the ECJ interpreted the similar terms used in Art. 3(c) and
the Annex to the Merger Directive.
106. The Dutch Supreme Court draws this distinction when interpreting the
term “liable to tax” contained in the residence article of tax treaties, corres-
ponding to Art. 4(1) of the OECD Model Convention (OECD Model).
According to the Dutch Supreme Court, a dual resident company is not fully
liable to tax and, therefore, not resident, in the state of its statutory seat/incor-
poration, but rather in the state of its real seat/place of its effective manage-
ment; see Hoge Raad, 28 February 2001, No. 35.557, BNB 2001/295. For com-
ments on (1) the full tax liability, see Paras. 3 and 8.3 OECD Commentary on
Art. 4 of the OECD Model (2008); (2) dual resident companies subject to tax
in more than one state, see Para. 21 OECD Commentary on Art. 4 of the
OECD Model (2008); and (3) the subject-to-tax clause, see Para. 15 OECD
Commentary on Art. 1 of the OECDModel (2008).
107. M.V. Lambooij, “De moeder-dochterrichtlijn en de Nederlandse
wetgeving”, FED’s Fiscaal Weekblad 153 (1991); C.W. van Noordenne, “De
Europese Moeder-Dochterrichtlijn”, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 443 (1991).
108. J.A.G. van der Geld,“Het wetsvoorstel tot implementatie van de Moeder-
Dochterrichtlijn”, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1991/1635; H.T.P.M. van den Hurk,
“Enige kanttekeningen bij de Moeder-Dochterrichtlijn”, Weekblad Fiscaal
Recht 1265 (1991); H.T.P.M. van den Hurk, “Onderworpenheid en
compartimentering; europees geïnterpreteerd”, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1434
(1994).
109. Point (s) of the Annex to the Directive.
110. ECJ, 5 November 2002, Case 208/00, Überseering BV; see D.M. Weber,
“Exit Taxes on the Transfer of Seat and the Applicability of the Freedom of
Establishment after Überseering”, European Taxation 10 (2003), p. 350.
111. Pursuant to Art. 3(5) of the Netherlands–Germany tax treaty, the com-
pany will be considered a resident of Germany as its place of management is in
Germany.
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If the catch-all clause must be interpreted as meaning
that the company should be “fully liable to tax” in the
Member State of incorporation (the Netherlands), the
dual-resident company will not qualify as a “company of
a Member State”. Although it is incorporated under
Dutch law, it is (no longer) fully liable for Dutch corpo-
rate income tax. On the other hand, the company is sub-
ject to German corporate income tax, but it is not incor-
porated under German law and, therefore, it also does
not qualify as a “company of a Member State” under the
“German” paragraph in the Annex.112
Applying the ECJ’s literal interpretation in Gaz de France
to this case may, therefore, lead to the conclusion that
this dual-resident company does not qualify under the
Annex to the Directive. This outcome would be contrary
to the aim of the Directive, which is the avoidance of
double taxation, as the profits received by the dual-resi-
dent company will be taxed under German tax law. A
more satisfying outcome would, therefore, be reached by
interpreting the term “subject to corporate tax” as mean-
ing that the form of the company must be subject to cor-
porate tax pursuant to the Dutch Corporate Income Tax
Act, rather than that the company should be “fully liable
to tax” in the Netherlands.
5.4. Listed hybrid entities
5.4.1. Considered transparent by the source state
From Gaz de France it must be concluded that a company
having a listed legal form that fulfils the other criteria of
the Directive is entitled to an exemption from dividend
withholding tax. This applies also if the source state con-
siders the entity transparent, whereas the resident state
considers the entity non-transparent (hybrid entities).
The Annex to the Directive lists several hybrid entities,
such as Belgian and Hungarian general partnerships
(‘société en nom collectif ’/ ‘vennootschap onder firma’
(SNC)113 and ‘betéti társaság’ (BT));114 and the Slovak and
Dutch limited partnerships (‘komanditná spoločnosť ’,115
and ‘open commanditaire vennootschap’ (OCV)).116
Although Art. 4(1a) of the Directive allows the Member
State of the parent company to consider its subsidiary
transparent, such a provision does not exist in the
reverse situation, where the Member State of the sub-
sidiary considers the parent company transparent.117
The source state is, therefore, held to apply Art. 5 of the
Directive and should provide an exemption from with-
holding tax. This is confirmed by the sixth recital of the
preamble to Directive 2003/123/EC:
[t]he new entities to be included in the list are corporate taxpay-
ers in their Member State of residence but some are considered
on the basis of their legal characteristics to be transparent for tax
purposes by other Member States. Member States treating non-
resident corporate taxpayers as fiscally transparent on this basis
should grant the appropriate tax relief in respect of revenue
which forms part of the tax base of the parent company.
The source state should also provide an exemption from
withholding tax on a distribution to a company it con-
siders transparent if that company has a legal form that is
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not explicitly listed, but nevertheless qualifies as a “com-
pany of a Member State” by virtue of a catch-all clause.
5.4.2. Full or partial exemption?
The remaining question is whether or not the source
state should provide a full exemption from withholding
tax or whether it is only required to provide a partial
exemption (exempting only the amount of withholding
tax corresponding to the share in the distribution of the
limited partners, since only that part is taxed at the level
of the partnership).118
The Directive does not explicitly refer to the object of
taxation. In order to qualify as a “company of a Member
State”, it is required that a company be listed and that it be
“subject to one of the [corporate income taxes enumer-
ated in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive], without the pos-
sibility of an option or of being exempt”.119 On the basis of
the ECJ’s“literal” interpretation in Gaz de France, it should
be argued that if a partnership is listed and subject to cor-
porate income tax, although only on the share of the lim-
ited partners, the source state should (still) provide a full
exemption. Based on the objective of the Directive (the
avoidance of double taxation), however, the authors are of
the view that an exemption should only be provided as
regards the share of the limited partners that is taxed at
the level of the partnership.The share of the dividend that
is attributable to the general partner (the transparent part
of the partnership) will not be subject to corporate
income tax at the level of the partnership and will, there-
fore, not result in double taxation at that level. Those div-
idends are taxed at the level of the general partner.
In the authors’ view, the source state should also only pro-
vide an exemption from withholding tax on the dividend
attributable to the general partner if the general partner is
a company subject to corporate income tax that would
also qualify as a “company of a Member State”. In a trian-
gular case, where the general partner is established in a
different (i.e. third) Member State than the distributing
company and the partnership, the partnership should be
considered to constitute a PE of the General Partner.
112. Point (f ) of the Annex to the Directive.
113. Point (b) of the Annex to the Directive.
114. Point (q) of the Annex to the Directive; Cartesio had the form of a BT;
CARTESIO, note 75.
115. Point (y) of the Annex to the Directive.
116. Point (s) of the Annex to the Directive.
117. See R. Russo, “Partnerships and Other Hybrid Entities and the EC Cor-
porate Direct Tax Directives”, European Taxation 10 (2006), p. 478, Para. 2; see,
for the treatment of hybrid entities under the Merger Directive, R. Russo and
R.Offermanns,“The 2005Amendments to the ECMerger Directive”,European
Taxation 6 (2006), p. 250, Paras. 3 and 8; and regarding Dutch legislation in
respect of hybrid entities implementing the 2003 amendment to the Directive:
R.W.J.K. Rademakers and M.J. Swets, “New Decrees on the Classification and
Tax Treatment of Foreign (Hybrid) Entities in the Netherlands”, European
Taxation 5 (2005), p. 171.
118. Since only that part of the profits is subject to corporate income tax at
the level of the partnership. See, for a description of the treatment of these
partnerships for tax purposes in the state of incorporation,OECD“TheAppli-
cation of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships”, Edition 6 of
Issues in International Taxation (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1999), Annex III to
the Partnership Report, p. 67 et seq.
119. Council Directive 2003/123/EC,Art. 3, Para. b.
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Fibbe120 finds support for this reasoning in the preamble
to Directive 2003/123/EC, which states that:
[t]he payment of profit distributions to, and their receipt by a
permanent establishment of a parent company should give rise
to the same treatment as that applying between a subsidiary and
its parent.121
If the general partner does not qualify as a “company of a
Member State”, the source state should not be required to
exempt withholding tax on the dividends attributable to
the general partner. If the full amount of dividend with-
holding tax is exempt, the status of the general partner
(“company of a Member State” or not) becomes irrele-
vant.
5.5. Non-listed hybrid entities
Applying the ECJ’s restrictive approach in Gaz de France
to a distribution to a non-listed hybrid entity leads to the
conclusion that the source state is not compelled, under
the Directive, to provide an exemption fromwithholding
tax.
An example of such a non-listed hybrid entity is a Czech
limited partnership, the ‘komanditní společnosť ’, which is
not explicitly mentioned in the Annex to the Directive.
Furthermore, the ‘komanditní společnosť’ cannot qualify
under a catch-all clause, as such a clause is non-existent
in respect of the Czech Republic.122 The profit share of
the limited partners is subject to Czech corporate
income tax. The Czech limited partnership seems to be
comparable to the explicitly listed Slovak and Dutch lim-
ited partnerships.123 In the authors’ view that is not very
consistent.
Other examples of non-listed hybrid entities are the
French partnerships (‘société en nom collectif’ (SNC) and
‘société en commandite simple’ (SCS)). These entities are
not explicitly listed in the Annex and may opt for the
corporate income tax regime. Although the SNC and
SCS fall within the scope of the catch-all clause, they do
not fulfil the criterion of Art. 2(c) of the Directive, as
they can opt to be subject/exempt from French corpo-
rate income tax. Neither the SNC nor the SCS, therefore,
qualify as a ‘company of a Member State’.
For those companies, the Aberdeen ‘approach’ would
apply. A dividend distribution to a Czech ‘komanditní
společnosť’, or a French SNC or SCS should thus be
exempt if that company is considered non-transparent
by the source state, and dividends to a national non-
transparent company are exempt by the source state.
6. Conclusion
In Gaz de France, the ECJ limits the personal scope of
the Directive to those companies having a legal form
(explicitly) listed in the Annex. The analysis of the
ECJ that led to the conclusion that an SAS cannot be
regarded as a “company of a Member State” can
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certainly be criticized. Based on the objective of the
Directive, and also on the basis of Art. 48 of the EC
Treaty (nowArt. 54 TFEU), several arguments can be
put forward for an extension of the scope of the
Directive to non-listed companies. The schematic
and historical interpretation applied by the ECJ lacks
cohesion.
The ECJ (correctly) holds that only an unfavourable
treatment of an SAS compared to a similar German
company may constitute an infringement of the
freedom of establishment. The ECJ neglects, however,
to analyse whether an unfavourable treatment of an
SAS compared to an SA may constitute a breach of
the principle of equality. In view of the apparent lack
of an explicit objective justification for the
distinction, the ECJ’s analysis is unsatisfying. The
judgment in Gaz de France is in line with the ECJ’s
earlier case law on the scope of the Directive,
including Aberdeen. The ECJ accepts that the
arbitrary distinction created by a restrictive
interpretation of the scope of the Directive does not
affect the Directive’s validity under primary EC (now
EU) law. In Gaz de France the ECJ did not apply the
lenient criteria set forth in Aberdeen to determine
whether or not an SAS was treated unfavourably as
opposed to a comparable German entity. The ECJ
leaves it up to the Member States to ensure that if a
dividend distribution to a national parent company
is exempt from withholding tax, a similar treatment
should be guaranteed in regards to a comparable
foreign parent company.
The ECJ’s literal and restrictive interpretation of the
Directive allows the conclusion that dual-resident
companies cannot qualify as companies of a Member
State. Furthermore, the ECJ’s approach may also have
undesirable effects if dividends are distributed to
hybrid entities. The authors, therefore, suggest a more
teleological approach, based on the Directive’s
objective of avoidance of double taxation.
120. This example is derived from G. Fibbe, “EC Law Aspects of Hybrid Entit-
ies”, IBFD Doctoral Series (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), pp. 302-306.
121. Para. 8 of the Preamble to Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 Decem-
ber 2003 amending the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on the common system of
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of differ-
ent Member States.
122. Point (d) of theAnnex to the Directive.Oddly, the ‘komanditní společnosť’
is listed under point (p) of the Annex to Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003
on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payment
made between associated companies of different Member States (OJ 2003,
L157/49).
123. Especially the Czech and Slovak limited partnerships are alike; both
from a corporate law point of view, and from a tax law point of view. When
Czechoslovakia fell apart into two states, the new states took over the 1991
Corporate law legislation of Czechoslovakia (see M. Pauknerová, “Entwick-
lungen im tschechischen internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht”, IPRax 2 (2007),
p. 162). The treatment under tax law is equal as well; see for the treatment of
these partnerships for tax purposes, OECD (1999), note 118. The Slovak lim-
ited partnership even has (practically) the same name as the Czech limited
partnership: a ‘komanditná spoločnosť’.
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